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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The sun rises over the mountains in Southern New Mexico and the 
windows of Spaceport America blind those looking on at the terminal.  A 
sudden boom shakes the ground and a plane unlike any other takes off 
toward the sky, leaving Spaceport America in the distance.1  Virgin 
Galactic’s2 WhiteKnightTwo, bolstering an impressive 140-foot wing span 
                                                             
∗ Federal Law Clerk to the Hon. Joseph M. Hood, District Judge, Eastern District of 
Kentucky. J.D., University of Kentucky College of Law; B.J., Business Foundations 
Certificate, University of Texas at Austin.  The author would like to express his thanks to 
Professor Richard C. Ausness for his help and encouragement throughout this process. 
 
1 See generally Image Gallery, SPACEPORT AM., 
http://www.spaceportamerica.com/news/photo-gallery.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) 
(inspiring this fictional account through drawings of Spaceport America). 
 
2 While this Article focuses on Virgin Galactic, other entities are developing commercial 
space travel technologies.  See, e.g., Associated Press, U.S. Space Tourism Firm 
Launches S. Korea Deal, DAILY RECORD (Morristown, N.J.), Dec. 18, 2009, at 
UPDATES01 (reporting that Xcor Aerospace recently struck a deal with South Korea to 
conduct launches in that nation).  Xcor must still complete the approval process and 
obtain the necessary export licensing, but the spaceship should be in the air by 2011.  See 
id.  
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and the capacity to carry close to 8,000 pounds of fuel, speeds skyward 
carrying SpaceShipTwo, measuring in at sixty feet in length with a forty-
two foot wide wing span, under its belly.3  SpaceShipTwo carries six 
passengers and two crew members, all of whom wait anxiously for their 
ship to leave WhiteKnightTwo and, eventually, Earth.4 
 
[2] During the first stage of the voyage, WhiteKnightTwo carries its 
cargo, including the eight lucky passengers, to an altitude of 50,000 feet.5  
As described by Virgin Galactic, the ride up “is marked with quiet 
contemplation but there’s an air of confidence and eager anticipation” 
before SpaceShipTwo is released from the grasps of its carrier.6  After 
that, pure excitement fills the passengers: 
 
[There is] a brief moment of quiet before a wave of 
unimaginable but controlled power surges through the craft.  
You are instantly pinned back into your seat, overwhelmed 
but enthralled by the howl of the rocket motor and the eye-
watering acceleration which, as you watch the read-out, has 
you travelling in a matter of seconds, at almost 2500mph, 
over 3 times the speed of sound.7 
 
[3] SpaceShipTwo speeds away from Earth into the upper layers of the 
atmosphere.8  The thrilling view from the windows changes from familiar 
                                                             
3 See Guy Norris, Quest for Space at Virgin Galactic, AVIATION WEEK (Sept. 4, 2009), 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/VI
RG09049.xml.  
 
4 See id. 
 
5 See Overview – Experience, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/ 
overview/experience/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).  
 
6 See id. 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 See id. 
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blue skies to the black skies of space,9 and the passengers’ senses are 
alerted to the sudden change in their environment as “the world contained 
in [their] spaceship has completely transformed.”10  Passengers, likely for 
the first time, experience the magic of outer space.  
 
[T]he gravity which has dominated every movement 
you’ve made since the day you were born is not there 
anymore.  There is no up and no down and you’re out of 
your seat experiencing the freedom that even your dreams 
underestimated.  After a graceful mid-space summersault 
you find yourself at a large window [looking at] a view that 
you’ve seen in countless images but the reality is so much 
more beautiful and provokes emotions that are strong but 
hard to define.11 
 
[4] The crew then requests passengers to return to their seats in 
preparation for re-entry.12  Gravity returns and passengers ready 
themselves for the strong g-forces associated with the return to Earth.13  As 
the ship glides home, the passengers return to familiar surroundings and 
carry the knowledge “that life will never quite be the same again.”14  
 
[5] Such a voyage might seem out of this world, but Virgin Galactic 
expects to start commercial space flights in 2011.15  Virgin Galactic 
already has a booking page on its website where, for a fee of $200,000 a 
                                                             
9 Id. 
 
10 See Overview – Experience, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/ 
overview/experience/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).  
 
11 Id. 
 
12 See id. 
 
13 See id. 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 See Norris, supra note 3.  
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ticket and deposits starting at $20,000, potential passengers can reserve a 
seat on one of the first flights.16  While the $200,000 price tag may prove 
too high for most people, Virgin Galactic promises the price will decrease 
over time,17 much like the price of flat-screen televisions.18  Yet even with 
the $200,000 bill, more than 350 people, collectively paying close to $40 
million in deposits, already have incurred the cost to secure a seat.19   
 
[6] Because commercial space travel is such a novel and unfamiliar 
experience, after potential passengers fill out the booking form Virgin 
Galactic contacts them to answer any questions.20  Additionally, Virgin 
Galactic employs fifty travel consultants trained specifically to provide 
specialized information about the space flights.21  The training for these 
specialized travel consultants includes trips to the “Kennedy Space Center 
at Cape Canaveral, Florida to learn about the history, physics, medical 
implications and specific flight details that are involved in suborbital 
flight, and experiencing weightlessness on ZERO-G, a specially modified 
Boeing 727.”22  
 
[7] But despite what appears to be the inevitable creation of a booming 
commercial space transportation industry, the possibility of commercial 
                                                             
16 Booking, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/booking/ (last visited Nov. 
7, 2010). 
 
17 See Overview – Space Tickets, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/ 
overview/space-tickets/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).  
 
18 See Norris, supra note 3.  See generally David Goldman, Flat-Screen TV Prices To 
Plunge for Holiday Season, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 23, 2010, 03:44 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/23/technology/lcd_tv_prices/ index.htm. 
 
19 See Park Avenue Travel; Park Avenue Travel’s Joshua Bush, Local Accredited Space 
Agent to Witness World Premiere of Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo, DEF. & AEROSPACE 
BUS., Dec. 23, 2009, at 64 [hereinafter Park Avenue Travel]. 
 
20 See Booking supra note 16.  
 
21 See Park Avenue Travel, supra note 19. 
 
22 Id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology                   Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
  5 
space travel raises questions of balancing safety concerns against the 
further development of a burgeoning business.23  Virgin Galactic claims 
safety “is at the heart of the design of [its] new vehicles and will be 
engrained in the culture of [its] space line operation.”24  In particular, 
Virgin Galactic points to two safety features of its aircraft.25  First, 
SpaceShipTwo will use a hybrid rocket motor, which gives pilots control 
of the rocket’s thrust, and the ability to abort during the boost phase.26  
Second, SpaceShipTwo will use a feathered re-entry system that allows 
the spacecraft to re-enter the atmosphere without the excessive heat 
commonly associated with this phase of space travel.27  
 
[8] Yet Virgin Galactic owner Sir Richard Branson admits that “[n]o 
new technology is without its risks, [a fact] one has to accept.”28  In 2004, 
the prototype for SpaceShipTwo “started rolling corkscrewlike on its way 
into space.”29  And in 2007, three engineers employed by Scaled 
                                                             
23 See Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118 
Stat. 3974 (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. ch. 701 (2004)) (amending 49 U.S.C. 
70101, which identifies Congressional findings as to commercial space launch activities, 
to note that “a critical area of responsibility for the Department of Transportation is to 
regulate the operations and safety of the emerging commercial human space flight 
industry; [and that] the public interest is served by creating a clear legal, regulatory, and 
safety regime for commercial human space flight; and [finally that] the regulatory 
standards governing human space flight must evolve as the industry matures so that 
regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose crew or space flight 
participants to avoidable risks as the public comes to expect greater safety for crew and 
space flight participants from the industry.”). 
 
24 Overview - Safety, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/overview/safety/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 
25 See id. 
 
26 See id. 
 
27 See id. 
 
28 Transcript of NBC Nightly News: Richard Branson To Offer Citizen Space Travel in 18 
Months (NBC television broadcast Dec. 7, 2009).   
 
29 Id. 
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Composites, LLC, a company partnering with Virgin Galactic to develop 
commercial space travel, died in a rocket engine explosion.30  Still, 
Branson’s faith in the technology is unwavering.  As a testament to his 
confidence, Branson plans to take several family members with him on the 
pioneering first flight.31  Such an intention indicates that, regardless of any 
inherent risks, Virgin Galactic is ready to move forward.32  As accredited 
Space Agent Joshua Bush stated, “[w]e’ve already taken deposits from 
clients for a space flight, and the [December 23, 2009] unveiling of 
SpaceShipTwo moves us one step closer to actual travel.”33 
 
[9] Although Virgin Galactic has taken steps to assure the public that 
its flights are safe, the federal government appears to struggle with exactly 
how to regulate this new method of travel.34  In particular, the government 
must determine how much, if any, regulation of spacecrafts like 
SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo is appropriate to ensure the safety of 
those involved, while at the same time not interfering with the further 
development of the industry.35  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”) and the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (“AST”) 
                                                             
30 See id; Ian O’Neill, Scaled Composites at Fault for Fatal Explosion, UNIVERSE TODAY, 
http://www.universetoday.com/12506/scaled-composites-at-fault-for-fatal-explosion/ 
(Jan. 19, 2008).  
 
31 See Transcript, supra note 28. 
 
32 See id. 
 
33 Park Avenue Travel, supra note 19.  
 
34 See The Federal Regulatory Approach to Commercial Space Transportation: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Sci. and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 
111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Dr. George C. Nield, Assoc. Adm’r for the Office of 
Commercial Space Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin.), available at http://legislative. 
nasa.gov/hearings/3-18-10%20NIELD.pdf. 
 
35  See id. at 4-6; supra note 23. 
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have dealt with similar questions since 2003.36  To evaluate this issue, the 
FAA and AST have asked following:   
 
How does the addition of humans on board RLVs [reusable 
launch vehicles] affect/challenge FAA/AST’s regulatory 
responsibility and regulatory approach? To what level of 
safety should they be allowed to fly.  
 
Should FAA/AST regulate human space flight by setting a 
limit on acceptable risk for humans on board RLVs?  
 
How should FAA/AST ensure the safety of humans on 
board RLVs? 
  
Are there lessons learned from commercial aviation that 
may be applicable to commercial space operations? What 
are they short of certification?37   
 
What, if any, type of liability, financial responsibility 
requirements, and/or liability risk-sharing regime should 
the U.S. government, via FAA/AST, seek to establish to 
protect passengers on board RLVs?”38 
 
                                                             
36 See Virgin Galactic SpaceShip - Aerospace Technology, AEROSPACE-TECH., 
http://www.aerospace-technology.com/projects/virgin-spaceship/ (last visited Nov. 10, 
2010) (noting the maiden voyage of SpaceShip One occurred on May 20, 2003).   
 
37 Patricia Grace Smith, Assoc. Adm’r for Commercial Space Transp., FAA, Long-Term 
Scenario for the Earth and Orbital Infrastructure, Int’l Air & Space Symposium and 
Exposition (July 17, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.faa.gov 
/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/PGS_AIAA_03-07-17.htm).  
 
38 Charity Trelease Ryabinkin, Note, Let There Be Flight: It’s Time to Reform the 
Regulation of Commercial Space Travel, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 101, 132- 33 (2004) (citing 
Office of the Assoc. Admin’r for Commercial Space Transp., Commercial Human Space 
Flight, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (2003), http://ast.faa.gov/COMSTAC/May 2003/Wong-
Human_Space_Flight.ppt). 
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[10] The answers to these questions do not come easily.  If the 
government regulates too heavily, the industry could suffer the way some 
claim the rail industry has suffered due to overregulation by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.39  With too little regulation, the industry presents 
safety concerns for the passengers, employees, and the general public.40  
Interestingly, products liability may present an unlikely solution to this 
problem.  Instead of attempting heavy regulation, Congress should adopt a 
strict liability approach for space flight operators similar to the approach 
used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck 
Corp.41 
 
[11] This Article evaluates the current and likely future state of federal 
regulation with respect to commercial space travel and proposes the 
adoption of the Francioni model of strict liability as a means to protect 
both public safety and the continued development of the space travel 
industry.  Section II describes the current state of space travel regulation, 
particularly as it pertains to reusable launch vehicles (“RLVs”).  Section 
III addresses how the international community handles liability regarding 
commercial space travel, as well as jurisdictional questions that may arise 
as a result of accidents associated with commercial space travel.  Section 
IV discusses a plaintiff’s ability, or lack thereof, to raise a claim under 
common law negligence, and Section V demonstrates why strict liability 
as applied to the manufacturers of the spacecraft will not protect 
passengers from the dangers of space travel.  Finally, Section VI will 
                                                             
39 See generally Albert Churella, Saving the Railroad Industry to Death: The Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Unfulfilled Promise of Rail-
Truck Cooperation, BUS. & ECON. HIST. ON-LINE (2006), http://www.thebhc.org/ 
publications/BEHonline/2006/churella.pdf. 
 
40  See Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118 
Stat. 3974 (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. ch. 701 (2004)) (amending 49 U.S.C. 
70101, which identifies Congressional findings as to commercial space launch activities, 
to note that “the regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as the 
industry matures so that regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose 
crew or space flight participants to avoidable risks as the public comes to expect greater 
safety for crew and space flight participants from the industry.”). 
 
41 See generally Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 739 (Pa. 1977). 
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explain how the application of the Francioni model of strict liability will 
ensure the safety of the passengers, and, just as importantly, maintain the 
regulation-free environment essential for successful commercial space 
travel. 
 
II.  WAITING FOR THE FIRST MOVE – THE CURRENT STATE OF 
COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL REGULATION 
  
[12] The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 created the AST, 
which originally operated within the Department of Transportation.42  In 
1995, AST oversight was reassigned to the FAA, under which the AST 
continues to serve as one of six operating offices, and the only department 
responsible for space-related matters.43  According to regulation, the AST 
operates as “a line of business within the Federal Aviation Administration 
[FAA],”44 and works with the FAA to regulate commercial space 
transportation, which includes maintenance of extensive licensing 
procedures for the operation of launch and re-entry sites.45  The primary 
duties of the AST include: 
 
Regulat[ing] the commercial space transportation industry, 
to ensure compliance with international obligations of the 
United States and to protect the public health and safety, 
safety of property, and national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States; 
Encourag[ing], facilitat[ing], and promot[ing] commercial 
space launches and reentries by the private sector; 
Recommend[ing] appropriate changes in Federal statutes, 
treaties, regulations, policies, plans, and procedures; and 
                                                             
42 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984); ALEXANDER 
T. WELLS & CLARENCE C. RODRIGUES, COMMERCIAL AIR SAFETY 27 (Scott Grillo & 
David E. Fogarty eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
  
43 WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42 at 26-27.  
 
44 14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (2010).  
 
45 See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 415, 433 (2010).  
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Facilitat[ing] the strengthening and expansion of the United 
States space transportation infrastructure.46 
 
[13] While the FAA does not have to follow the framework used to 
develop the safety standards for the nation’s airports and commercial 
aviation providers to develop regulations for the commercial space travel 
industry,47 a brief discussion of the history of regulation in the commercial 
aviation industry provides guidance into what the future of commercial 
space travel regulation may look like.  The remainder of this section will 
take a brief look at the past and current state of commercial aviation and 
discuss the high potential of agency capture under the current regime.   
 
A.  A Brief Look Back – The FAA Regulation and Deregulation 
of the Commercial Aviation Industry 
 
[14] The difficulties associated with safety regulation in the aviation 
industry have existed since the mid-1920s, when pilots returning from 
World War I “bought surplus war aircraft and went into business.”48  At 
the outset, the aircraft were used primarily for traveling aerial shows 
because the lower costs and ease of accessibility of the country’s extensive 
water and rail systems made commercial air travel prohibitively 
expensive.49  It was only in the wake of the creation of the United States 
Air Mail Service, and the regulations mandating that pilots attain a 
minimum of 500 hours of flying experience to be eligible for aerial mail 
delivery, that commercial aviation began to take form.50 
                                                             
46 About the Office, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/ 
office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/ about/ (last updated Feb. 17, 2010) (describing the 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation, a branch of the Federal Aviation 
Administration); see 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-19 (2006). 
 
47 In fact, the FAA likely will take a much more streamlined approach because it has a 
better idea of what works based on its previous work regulating the commercial aviation 
industry. 
 
48 WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 3. 
 
49 See id. 
 
50 See id. at 3-4. 
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[15] Since the federal government had not created a safety program for 
aviators, “a number of states [passed] legislation requiring aircraft 
licensing and registration.”51  Local governments also added to the safety 
regulations, “enact[ing] ordinances regulating flight operations and pilots, 
[which created] a patchwork of safety-related requirements. . . .”52   
 
[16] Eventually, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 
which gave the Department of Commerce the authority to regulate air 
commerce.53  In accordance with this authority, the Air Commerce Act of 
1926 imposed upon the Department of Commerce several duties, 
including the duties to: promote air commerce, which entailed the 
responsibility to create air navigation facilities and airports, investigate air 
navigation accidents, investigate the development of the aeronautical 
industry, and advise the executive branch regarding the improvement of 
air navigation; regulate and maintain the standards of acceptable aircraft, 
airmen and facilities; regulate facilities, crafts and airmen connected with 
interstate and foreign commerce; and create air traffic safety rules.54  The 
authority and duties identified in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 laid the 
foundation for the establishment of what is now the FAA, and are the 
same regulations and responsibilities under which the FAA continues to 
function.55  
  
[17] The first federal aviation regulations were crafted following 
“substantial input from aircraft manufacturers, air transport operators, and 
                                                             
51 Id. at 4. 
 
52 Id. at 4. 
 
53 See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568. The act defines “Air 
Commerce” as “transportation in whole or in part by aircraft of persons or property for 
hire, navigation of aircraft in furtherance of a business, or navigation of aircraft from one 
place to another for operation in the conduct of a business.” Id. 
 
54 See id. at §§ 2-3, 5-7; see also WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 4. 
 
55 The FAA carries on the same responsibilities even after its move from the Department 
of Commerce to the Department of Transportation.  See History, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
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the insurance industry.”56  With time, these safety measures decreased the 
number of crashes among private and passenger aircraft, such that 
[b]etween 1930 and 1932, the fatality rate per 100 million passenger-miles 
declined by 50 percent.”57  But a succession of devastating accidents in the 
1950s exposed a glaring need to improve the aviation safety regime.58  
This revelation prompted Congress to enact the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, which established the Federal Aviation Agency and “provide[d] for 
the regulation and promotion of civil aviation in such a manner as to best 
foster its development and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient 
use of the airspace by both civil and military aircraft.”59 
 
[18] The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 granted the Federal Aviation 
Agency a wide range of powers relating to the regulation of United States 
airspace, including the authority to: further the development of domestic 
and foreign air commerce; create a framework for the use of airspace; and 
formulate rules and regulations regarding the practices, standards and 
procedures of airspace use, and the materials, construction and standards 
of aircraft designs.60  From its inception, the agency grew rapidly, 
increasing by 10,000 employees between 1959 and 1961.61  In 1966, 
Congress enacted the Department of Transportation Act, which 
transitioned agency oversight to the Department of Transportation and 
                                                             
56 WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 4.   
 
57 Id. at 5. 
 
58 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Independence of Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities: 
Keeping the Foxes from the Henhouse, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 223, 263 (2010).  The events 
triggering the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 included a 1956 mid-air 
collision over the Grand Canyon, a 1957 mid-air collision over California, and a 1958 
mid-air collision over an area close to Las Vegas, Nevada. Id.  
 
59 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.  
 
60 See id. at §§ 305, 307(a)-(c), 312(a), 316. 
 
61 See WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 8.   
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renamed the Federal Aviation Agency the Federal Aviation 
Administration.62  
 
[19] The history of the FAA also involves overregulation and, more 
recently, evidence of agency capture.63  Before 1978, the government 
dictated permissible air routes and ticket prices.64  The Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 – authorized amidst congressional speculation 
that deregulation would lead to a decrease in the cost of air fares – 
changed that standard.65  The New York Times aptly described the Airline 
Deregulation Act as the government’s transformation of “air travel into 
mass transportation.”66  By 2000, airlines carried three times as many 
passengers at rates forty percent lower than the fares airlines charged in 
the late 1970s.67  
 
[20] But while industry deregulation blew open the door for air travel, 
economic growth created problems for air traffic controllers trying to keep 
up with increased demand.68  Because there are a limited number of 
                                                             
62 Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, § 3(e)(1)-(2) 
(1966); see WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 8.   
 
63 See Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal 
Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 405-09 (2002).  “Capture theory is based on the notion that proper 
public focus of governmental agencies can be effectively distracted by the private 
interests of regulated entities.”  Id. at 392. 
 
64 See WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 42, at 9.   
 
65 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705; WELLS & 
RODRIGUES, supra note 41, at 9.   
 
66 Id. 
 
67 See Laurence Zuckerman & Matthew L. Wald, GRIDLOCK IN THE SKIES: A Special 
Report.; Crisis for Air Traffic System: More Passengers, More Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2000, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9500E0DE1F30F936A3575AC0A9669C8B63&scp=1&sq=zuckerman%20gridlock&st=
cse.   
 
68 See generally id.  
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suitable areas for air traffic facilities and a limited number of usable air 
traffic routes, it is inevitable that the increasing demand resulting from 
economic growth will far exceed supply.69  As a congressional blue-ribbon 
panel noted, “[t]he [FAA] currently lacks the organizational, management, 
and financial wherewithal to keep pace with the dynamic aviation 
community.”70  Commentators also have suggested the FAA’s dual 
mandate of “the protection of airline safety on one hand, and the 
‘fostering’ of successful air commerce . . . on the other” has caused 
problems leading to agency capture,71 and at least one commentator has 
suggested agency capture might have contributed to the September 11, 
2001 attacks.72  
 
B. NASA – The New Consumer of Commercial Space Technology 
 
[21] While the impending birth of the commercial space market has 
prompted the need for a regulatory or liability scheme to govern the 
industry, recent developments have only made the need more pressing.  In 
an April 2010 speech, President Barack Obama encouraged private 
companies to pursue innovations that will benefit the United States’ space 
program.73  Prior to this speech, the President, in a February 2010 budget 
request, proposed the cancellation of the Constellation program, which 
intended to return astronauts to the moon, and looked to private companies 
to supply spacecraft for the government.74  Notably, this includes a call for 
                                                             
69 See generally id. 
 
70 NAT’L CIVIL AVIATION REVIEW COMM’N, AVOIDING AVIATION GRIDLOCK: A 
CONSENSUS FOR CHANGE (1997), available at http://www.avweb.com/other/ 
ncarcrpt/ncarcrpt.pdf. 
 
71 See Niles, supra note 63, at 407.  
 
72 See id. at 410-12.  
 
73 Kenneth Chang, In Call to Alter NASA, Obama Vows Renewed Space Program, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A18. 
 
74 Id. 
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the private sector to develop spacecraft “for carrying astronauts to the 
International Space Station.”75 
 
[22] While the President claimed he was “100 percent committed to the 
mission of NASA and its future,” critics began to take aim at the new 
plan.76  Former astronauts Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell and Eugene Cernan 
stated in a letter that President Obama’s budget for NASA was 
“devastating” to the country’s space program, and that “[w]ithout the skill 
and experience that actual spacecraft operation provides, the [United 
States] is far too likely to be on a long downward slide to mediocrity.”77  
Others, such as Alabama Senator Richard C. Shelby, whose state had the 
chief design contract for the Constellation program, called President 
Obama’s plans to encourage development of commercial spacecraft “‘a 
welfare program for the commercial space industry.’”78  Other members of 
Congress have introduced legislation intended to keep the space shuttles 
out of retirement.79 
 
[23] However, the commercial space industry has already begun filling 
the void left in the wake of President Obama’s announcement to scale 
back NASA.  In June 2010, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation 
(“SpaceX”) launched the first private rocket, which ultimately could take 
astronauts into orbit.80  The Falcon 9 rocket, measuring in at 154-feet, 
735,000 pounds, burned for nine minutes before reaching its 155 miles 
                                                             
75 Id. 
 
76 Sandra Frederick, Uncertain Launch for Obama’s Space Mission, Critics Hit Change 
in Emphasis, THE WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A3.  
 
77 Letter from Neil Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11, et al., (Apr. 2010) available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/36470363/ns/nightly_news. 
 
78 Kenneth Chang, Obama’s NASA Blueprint Is Challenged in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2010, at A16 (quoting Sen. Richard C. Shelby). 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 Kenneth Chang, Private Rocket’s First Flight Is a Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, 
at A11.  
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target orbit.81  Despite SpaceX claims that the launch was a success, others 
question the effectiveness of using the private sector to develop the 
country’s space program.   
 
[24] Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who represents the home-
state of NASA, noted that “‘[e]ven this modest success is more than a year 
behind schedule, and the project deadlines of other private space 
companies continue to slip as well.’”82  Others urge that the private sector 
should serve to supplement NASA’s space flight program and not replace 
it entirely.83  Regardless, SpaceX stated that with the aid of a government 
contract it would need only three years to develop a Falcon 9 rocket 
capable of taking American astronauts into orbit.84 
 
[25] One commentator has recently compared the privatization of the 
space industry with the beginnings of the airlines and the enactment of the 
Kelly Airmail Act, which gave the U.S. Postal Service the chance to 
subcontract mail delivery with commercial airlines.85  The Kelly Airmail 
Act, coupled with the measures previously discussed in Part II.A, allowed 
the commercial airlines to expand their routes, which helped lead to the 
commercial airline system we know today.86  But the underlying problem 
remains the same: how to encourage the development of new technologies 
intended to expand the potential of the commercial market while ensuring 
the safety for all those involved.  As stated in a recent edition of 
Washington Monthly, “NASA is gambling that private corporations, some 
of them as yet untested in spaceflight, can carry astronauts to the space 
station more safely than the space shuttle, even as the agency exercises 
                                                             
81 Id. 
 
82 Id. (quoting Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison). 
 
83 Id. 
 
84 Id. 
 
85 Charles Homans, The Wealth of Constellations: Can the Free Market Save the Space 
Program?, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1, 2010, at 18(9). 
 
86 Id.; see supra Part I.A.  
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less safety oversight over them – a plan that runs counter to the 
recommendations of every major accident investigation NASA has 
conducted.”87  NASA administrator Charles Bolden Jr. has emphasized 
that safety remains a priority at NASA and the same safety standards set 
forth by NASA itself would apply to the private sector’s attempts to fill 
NASA’s needs.88  In response, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama 
claimed, “‘[t]hat’s not the message that’s being received at NASA right 
now.’”89 
 
[26] Still, if past attempts by private enterprises to use NASA facilities 
can serve as an example, the quest for safety could drive the best of the 
private sector out of the public space contracting business.90  Starfighters, 
Inc. was the first commercial provider to use the Kennedy Space Center’s 
Shuttle Landing Facility in Florida, where it houses four F-104 jets on the 
premises.91  The corporation offers the public suborbital flight training and 
provides the government with the opportunity to perform microgravity 
experiments.92  But Starfighters, Inc. spent two-years before it gained 
NASA’s permission to use the facility.93  Corporation President and Chief 
Pilot Rick Svetkoff stated, “‘It nearly put us out of business. . . . Going in 
as the first, it was extremely difficult.  We went through a lot of 
hurdles.’”94  Svetkoff believes the reason behind the difficulties lies in 
                                                             
87 Homans, supra note 85.  
 
88 Mary Orndorff, Shelby Confronts NASA Chief on Leadership, BIRMINGHAM NEWS 
(ALA.), Apr. 23, 2010, at 3.  
 
89 Id. 
 
90 Wanted: New Partners, FLORIDA TODAY (MELBOURNE, FLA.), Apr. 18, 2010, at E1.  
 
91 Id. 
 
92 Id. 
 
93 Id. 
 
94 Id. (quoting Rick Svetkoff, President and Chief Pilot, Starfighters, Inc.). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology                   Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
  18 
NASA’s inexperience in dealing with the private market.95 As he stated, 
“‘[NASA is] not commercially oriented.”96  
 
[27] Thus, while NASA tries to maintain its commitment to safety 
when dealing with the private sector, the mandatory dealing with private 
space flight companies of President Obama’s plan might jeopardize 
NASA’s safety regulations.  Using the airline industry as an example, 
NASA’s primary focus on safety will begin to bend in favor of 
deregulation and more flexibility in dealings with the commercial market.  
Thus, the agency with the expertise and knowledge to properly regulate 
the commercial space travel market at this early stage will have to favor 
the private market in its dealings.  Yet, the airline industry has already 
faced this reality, as it routinely deals with the problems associated with 
the dual mandate of the FAA and the potential for agency capture.   
 
C.  The Current State of Regulation in Commercial Space Travel  
and Potential Agency Capture 
  
[28] Court confidence in agency expertise began to waver during the 
1960s and 1970s.97  Around the same time, academia identified agency 
capture as a cause of the growing skepticism surrounding agency 
expertise.98  The theory of agency capture suggests “that agencies go 
through a natural ‘life cycle,’” wherein the early phases of an agency’s 
existence are “characterized by vigorous and independent regulation, not 
unlike the role for agencies imagined by the public interest literature,” but 
the later phases are “closely identified with and dependent upon the 
industry it is charged with regulating.”99  
                                                             
95 Wanted: New Partners, FLORIDA TODAY (MELBOURNE, FLA.), Apr. 18, 2010, at E1.  
 
96 Id. (quoting Rick Svetkoff, President and Chief Pilot, Starfighters, Inc.). 
 
97 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1060 (1997). 
 
98 Id. 
 
99 Id. (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION (1955)).  
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[29] The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue in Home Box Office, Inc v. 
FCC, in which the court considered ex parte communications between 
cable providers and the FCC.100  The court stated:  
 
Although it is impossible to draw any firm 
conclusions about the effect of ex parte presentations upon 
the ultimate shape of the pay cable rules, the evidence is 
certainly consistent with often-voiced claims of undue 
industry influence over Commission proceedings, and we 
are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules 
we are reviewing here may have been by compromise 
among the contending industry forces, rather than by 
exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest 
the Communications Act vests in individual 
commissioners.101 
 
[30] During the early 1980s, judicial thought shifted from agency 
capture toward a new operational method known as the “public choice 
theory.”102  This theory is premised on the idea that agencies no longer 
operate as instruments of the industries they regulate, rather they act in 
their own interests to preserve their continued existence.103  Under either 
theory – agency capture or public choice – the agency premises its action 
on the survival of the industry it serves.  For example, the FAA makes 
safety approval determinations related to commercial space travel 
according to “performance-based criteria, against which [it] may assess 
the effect on public health and safety and on safety of property, in the 
following hierarchy: (1) FAA or other appropriate Federal regulations[;] 
(2) Government-developed or adopted standards[;] (3) Industry consensus 
performance-based criteria or standard[;] (4) Applicant-developed 
                                                             
100 See generally Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 
101 Id. at 53.  
 
102 See Merrill, supra note 97, at 1068-69.  
 
103 See id. at 1068-71. 
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criteria.”104  The applicant-developed criteria category allows the 
manufacturer to define its own performance standards based on four 
factors, and is the last category to which the FAA will look.105  
 
[31] The development of the airline industry demonstrates that 
deregulation can prove “one of the government’s most successful 
economic initiatives.”106  Limited regulation in the early days of 
commercial aviation developed the industry into what we know today and, 
as discussed earlier, made airlines a realistic mode of transportation for 
nearly all American citizens.107  In the realm of space travel, similar limits 
on regulation will likely grant companies developing technologies 
significant leeway for innovative discovery and manufacturing, while 
providing the FAA and AST a final say on safety.  This allows the FAA 
and AST to meet its dual mandate to:  
 
[E]ncourage private sector launches, reentries, and 
associated services and, only to the extent necessary, 
regulate those launches, reentries, and services to ensure 
compliance with international obligations of the United 
States and to protect the public health and safety, safety of 
property, and national security and foreign policy interests 
of the United States.108  
 
[32] The problem occurs when FAA and AST regulations become a 
means by which developing industries push the envelope at the expense of 
safety.  American University Professor of Law Mark C. Niles considers 
this problem in his paper addressing potential agency capture within the 
                                                             
104 14 C.F.R. § 414.19 (2010).  
 
105 See id. 
 
106 See Zuckerman & Wald, supra note 67.  
 
107 See infra Part II.A.  
 
108 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2006). 
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FAA leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks.109  Niles suggests the 
FAA suffered from agency capture at the time of the attacks,110 and notes 
that the dual mandate to promote aviation and provide for its safety creates 
inconsistent goals.111  As another commentator observed, “[t]hese 
conflicting purposes are an obvious problem once one realizes that for 
every proposed safety regulation, the FAA must weigh the cost of 
implementation and determine if it is worth the financial strain on the 
airlines.”112  According to Niles, this framework led to individual airlines 
implementing passenger safety regulations, rather than airports or the 
FAA.113  While Niles does not believe there is enough evidence to show 
the FAA has succumbed to agency capture, he concludes “that effective 
regulation within the airline industry in promotion of the public interest is 
less of a priority for the FAA than ensuring that the industry be provided 
with an atmosphere where it can thrive financially.”114  Thus, Niles 
believes, “The FAA demonstrates all the signs of an agency that has 
allowed private pressure to undermine its public responsibility, and its 
regulations are tragically deficient as a result.”115 
 
[33] An analysis of agency capture and any similar acquiescence by the 
FAA and AST to the private pressures of the commercial space travel 
                                                             
109 See generally Niles, supra note 63, at 413. 
 
110 Cf. id. at 406 (“[T]he FAA has consistently promoted the interests of the airline 
industry at the expense of the broader public interest, including airline safety and 
security.”).  
 
111 Id. at 412-16.  
 
112 Lea Ann Carlisle, Comment, The FAA v. the NTSB: Now That Congress Has 
Addressed the Federal Aviation Administration’s “Dual Mandate,” Has the FAA Begun 
Living up to Its Amended Purpose of Making Air Travel Safer, or Is the National 
Transportation Safety Board Still Doing Its Job Alone?, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 741, 741 
(2001)); see also Niles, supra note 63, at 413-16. 
 
113 See id. at 426-27 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c)(2)(B) (1994)). 
 
114 Id. at 422. 
 
115 Niles, supra note 63, at 442. 
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industry is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, it is clear that 
giving an industry such a powerful say in regulations affecting the 
development of the space travel industry development may result in 
disastrous consequences.  Importantly, the FAA and the AST have yet to 
face these issues in the emerging space flight industry.116  As such, the 
FAA and AST have an opportunity to ensure the space flight industry does 
not fall into the same passenger safety trap as commercial airlines.117  
Time to change these ineffective policies and attitudes runs short, 
however, as Virgin Galactic makes plans to begin commercial space 
flights within the next year.118  While safety remains a primary concern, 
the FAA and AST must also follow their mandate to encourage the 
development of this exciting industry,119 which means supporting Virgin 
Galactic’s efforts to launch its services in 2011.120  
 
[34] One way to deal with the inherent conflict between safety 
regulation and industry development involves the FAA and AST working 
with the commercial space industry to reach a solution at the onset of the 
industry.  But this solution provides a less than satisfactory guarantee of 
safety to passengers who rely on the FAA and AST’s mandate “to protect . 
. . public health and safety.”121  Furthermore, such a solution makes it 
harder for passengers to bring a claim against providers like Virgin 
                                                             
116 Cf. Cheryl Pellerin, U.S. Agencies, Companies Work to Commercialize Space Travel, 
Business Growing for Spaceports, Commercial Launches, Space Station Flights, 
AMERICA.GOV (May 29, 2009), http://www.america.gov/st/scitech-english/2009/ 
May/20090529163746lcnirellep0.2032587.html (discussing the recent evolution of the 
industry and acknowledging that the AST has issued just 196 licenses for launch since the 
office’s inception more than 20 years ago).  
 
117 See generally Niles, supra note 63, at 413. 
 
118 See Norris, supra note 3. 
 
119 See 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2006);  
 
120 Norris, supra note 3. 
 
121 See 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2006); Pellerin, supra note 114 (noting that the AST 
must seek “to ensure public safety during commercial launch and re-entry activities.”). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology                   Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
  23 
Galactic if something goes wrong.122  In essence, giving the commercial 
space flight industry the ability to regulate itself means consumers will 
have a difficult road making claims against operators in the industry.  
Under these circumstances, the commercial space flight industry has no 
incentive to maintain safety from the outset or, for that matter, in the 
future. 
 
[35] Thus, Congress and the courts must ensure the safety of the 
passengers from the outset of this industry and prevent the FAA and AST 
from falling victim to agency capture through the creation of a legal 
regime, a concept that is not new, to deal with extraordinary 
circumstances.123  Consider the establishment of maritime law and the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.124  The act stated that 
the provided remedies “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability 
of such employer to the employee,”125 and intended to provide uniformity 
regarding incidents on the many different state shores across the 
country.126  Accordingly, the law applies uniformly across state and federal 
courts.127  
 
[36] The United States Supreme Court holds that if a plaintiff 
experiences an injury on board a ship in navigable waters, “[t]he legal 
rights and liabilities arising from that conduct [are] within the full reach of 
the admiralty jurisdiction and [measured] by the standards of [federal] 
                                                             
122 See discussion infra Parts III-V.  
 
123 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 
124 Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 Stat. 1424 
(1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2006)).  
 
125 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (2006). 
 
126 See Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing S. Pac. 
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)). 
 
127 See, e.g., id. (citing State Indus. Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 274-76 
(1922)). 
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maritime law.”128  The Court applies this “‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine” to 
personal maritime actions.129  As such, while state courts may still hear 
these cases, they must apply federal law.130  
 
[37] The Court should apply a similar doctrine to the commercial space 
travel industry.  Such a doctrine would ensure uniformity on an issue that 
spans around the globe.  Furthermore, because the United States will soon 
face liability for spaceships taking off from its soil, liability in space travel 
will be a federal issue with state common law themes.131  To ensure 
uniformity, Congress must devise an acceptable liability scheme before 
allowing spaceships to take flight.  To accomplish this goal, the United 
States should adopt a solution similar to the novel approach Pennsylvania 
courts use in products liability law as applied to amusement park 
operators.132  The need to implement this solution becomes apparent after 
considering alternative methods for bringing claims against companies 
such as Virgin Galactic.  
 
III.  THEORIES OF LIABILITY BASED ON INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
 
A.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space,  
Including the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies 
 
[38] The United States and eighty-three other countries entered into a 
treaty concerning space travel less than two years before Neil Armstrong 
                                                             
128 Kermarec v. Compagnie, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959). 
 
129 Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (citing William F. Baxter, 
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1963)).  
 
130 See Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 628.  
 
131 See infra Part III.  
 
132 See infra Part VI.  See generally Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 
739 (Pa. 1977). 
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walked on the moon in July 1969.133  The rationale behind the treaty was 
to “reduce the danger of conflict in space.”134  As the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations stated in a message directed to the major superpowers, 
“[a]s man ventures into space, he cannot rely solely on his scientific and 
technological knowledge, great as it may be.  He must equally depend on 
legally binding universal standards of conduct, progressively developed as 
science unravels the mysteries of space.”135 
 
[39] The Treaty does not deal solely with military issues, but also 
assesses liability on an international scale for all objects launched into 
space.136  In particular, article VII states:  
 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or 
procures the launching of an object into outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each 
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is 
launched, is internationally liable for damage to another 
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical 
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, 
in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies.137  
                                                             
133 See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force Oct. 27, 1967) 
[hereinafter Treaty]; Press Release, Secretary-General, Message Sent to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, and Prime Minister Harold Wilson on 
the Occasion of the Signing of the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Other Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/646 (Jan. 27, 1967), reprinted in 7 PUBLIC PAPERS OF 
THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1965-1967, at 374 (Andrew W. 
Cordier & Max Harrelson eds., 1976) [hereinafter Message]. 
 
134 See Message, supra note 133, at 375. 
 
135 Id.  
 
136 See generally Treaty, supra note 133, at art. VIII.  
 
137 Id. at art. VII. 
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[40] As such, under this treaty, the United States faces potential liability 
for anything that goes wrong with a commercial space flight taking off 
from United States territory.  This not only includes falling pieces of 
debris landing in foreign countries, but injury to foreign nationals resulting 
from the spacecraft’s presence in air space or outer space.138  The potential 
for such liability has led to the requirement that operations must buy $500 
million in third-party liability insurance with the government responsible 
for up to $1.5 billion for remaining damages.139   
 
[41] Notably, the Treaty further mandates that “[a] State Party to the 
Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried 
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any 
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.”140  As a 
result, the D.C. Circuit Court recognized that, while the Treaty does not 
expressly address tort claims, “the basic principle is that in the 
sovereignless reaches of outer space, each state party to the treaty will 
retain jurisdiction over its own objects and persons.”141  Thus, United 
States law controls issues of liability for accidents occurring during space 
flights from the United States, including Virgin Galactic flights from 
Spaceport America.  This empowers Congress and the courts to ensure the 
liability standards for commercial space travel remain fair and equitable.   
  
B.  The Warsaw Convention, Montreal Accord, and Montreal Protocols 
 
[42]  Under the Warsaw Convention the international community agreed 
to regulate “all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods 
                                                             
138 Id. 
 
139 See Ryabinkin, supra note 37, at 120. 
 
140 Treaty, supra note 133, at art. VIII. 
 
141 Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Treaty, supra note 
131, at art. VIII).  The Tax Court also acknowledged in dicta that no state has sovereignty 
over outer space.  See Rogers v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1573, 1573 n.13 (T.C. 2009).  
The court noted, “[I]ncome earned in outer space would not be considered foreign earned 
income. . . . For Federal income tax purposes, income earned in outer space would be 
treated just like income earned in international waters or in international airspace.”  Id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology                   Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
  27 
performed by aircraft for hire.”142  The Warsaw Convention, as modified 
by the Montreal Accord of 1966 and the Montreal Protocols,143 governs 
the scope of air carrier liability for injuries to passengers or damage to 
luggage.144  The original language of the Warsaw Convention caps the 
liability of an air carrier, which the Montreal Accord set at $75,000,145 
unless “the damage is caused by [its] wilful [sic] misconduct or by such 
default on [its] part as, in accordance with the law of the Court to which 
the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful [sic] 
misconduct.”146  In light of the liability cap, the necessary standard to 
circumvent the cap and the overall forgiving nature of the Warsaw 
Convention, it is apparent that “the Warsaw Convention and initial lack of 
domestic regulation provided the U.S. airline industry with the 
combination of protection and freedom it needed to flourish.”147  However, 
does the Warsaw Convention provide the appropriate liability scheme for 
                                                             
142 See generally Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Transportation by Air art. 1, § 1, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. 
 
143 See Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, Order 
Approving Agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302, 7302 (May 19, 1966); Additional Protocol 
No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 2145 U.N.T.S. 36 [hereinafter Montreal 
Protocol No. 4]; LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: 
A LEGAL HANDBOOK 7-8 (2000).  The Warsaw Convention was also modified by other 
international agreements, such as the Hague Protocol (1955), which the United States 
never ratified, but subsequently adopted after agreeing to the Montreal Protocol No. 4, 
and the Guatemala City Protocol (1971).  See GOLDHIRSCH at 6. 
 
144 See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 142.  
 
145 See Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention, supra note 143; Byrd v. Comair, Inc. 
(In re air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006), 501 F. Supp. 2d 902, 908-13 (E.D. 
Ky. 2007) (citing In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. On Dec. 21, 1988), 928 F.2d 
1267, 1270 n.2 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 
146 Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at ch. 25; see also El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. 
Tseng, 525 U.S. 151, 166-67 (1999)).  
 
147 Ryabinkin, supra note 38, at 105.   
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the commercial space flight industry?148  Proper evaluation of this question 
begins with an analysis of the language governing the scope of the 
Warsaw Convention.   
 
[43] Chapter I of the Warsaw Convention states, “[t]his convention shall 
apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods 
performed by aircraft for hire.  It shall apply equally to gratuitous 
transportation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise.”149  
The United States Code defines the term “aircraft” as “any contrivance 
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”150  Utilizing this 
broad definition of “aircraft,” it appears the Warsaw Convention may 
apply to incidents arising from commercial space travel.  After all, 
spaceships like SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo “navigate, or fly in, 
the air,” and therefore fit the Code’s definition of “aircraft.”151  But it is the 
definition of “launch vehicle” – “a vehicle built to operate in, or place a 
payload or human beings in, outer space; and . . . a suborbital rocket,” that 
applies more directly to crafts such as SpaceShipTwo and 
WhiteKnightTwo.152  Therefore, a court is more likely to classify 
SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo as “launch vehicles,” rather than 
“aircraft[s].”  
 
[44] The text of the Warsaw Convention considered the idea of 
“experimental trial” aircraft.153  In doing so, it stated:  
 
                                                             
148 At least one commentator chose not to apply the Warsaw Convention liability scheme 
to commercial space travel.  See generally Ryabinkin, supra note 38, at 106-07.  
 
149 Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 1.  
 
150 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2006).  It is of note that the United States adopted this 
definition well before the enactment of the Warsaw Convention.  See generally id. 
 
151 See id; Norris, supra note 3. 
 
152 Id. § 70102(8)(A)-(B) (2006).  
 
153 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 34.  
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This convention shall not apply to international 
transportation by air performed by way of experimental 
trial by air navigation enterprises with the view to the 
establishment of regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it 
apply to transportation performed in extraordinary 
circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier’s 
business.154  
 
[45] Although it is unlikely the signatory nations considered 
commercialized space travel, Virgin Galactic’s WhiteKnightTwo and 
SpaceShipTwo might fall under the Convention’s definition of 
experimental trial.155  If so, other commercial space travel operations could 
arguably fit as well, and regardless of the signatories’ actual intent, a court 
would likely characterize the commercial space industry as 
“experimental.”156  If courts draw this conclusion, industry participants, 
from passengers to carriers, face potentially limitless liability since the 
Convention would not apply in a commercial space industry case.157  
Therefore, Congress must adopt the Francioni products liability scheme.158  
 
IV.  NEGLIGENCE – WHAT IS THE DUTY? WHERE’S THE CAUSE? 
 
[46] Since negligence is primarily a state law concept, negligence 
claims brought in federal courts are generally adjudicated under state 
law.159  Thus, while the Warsaw Convention gives the federal judiciary 
                                                             
154 Id. 
 
155 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 34 
 
156 “Experimental” means “pertaining to, derived from or founded on experiment.” 
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY  681 (2d ed. 1993).  “Experiment” means “a 
test, trial, or tentative procedure; an act or operation for the purpose of discovering 
something unknown.”  Id. 
 
157 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 142, at art. 34 
 
158 See infra Part VI.  
 
159 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  
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jurisdiction,160 the Erie doctrine requires that the federal courts apply the 
appropriate state law concerning common law negligence.161  But the Erie 
doctrine’s restriction on federal courts does not apply “in matters governed 
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.”162  As a result, 
federal common law still exists today.163  Congress should act now to 
define a workable liability scheme that ensures uniformity for space travel 
liability issues before the fifty states set up their own regimes.   
 
[47] As previously stated, the federal courts could impose a “reverse-
Erie” doctrine allowing the cases to go forward in state courts, which 
arguably are better suited to handle this style of case, while Congress and 
the federal courts establish the law in light of its national and international 
implications.  Given the law’s present state, this Article looks to New 
Mexico law, since it appears this state will be the first to deal with these 
extraordinary concepts.  
 
[48] New Mexico law specifically allows a plaintiff to bring a design 
defect claim in both strict liability and negligence.164  The New Mexico 
Supreme Court has established the elements of negligence as follows: 
 
Generally, a negligence claim requires the existence 
of a duty from a defendant to a plaintiff, breach of that 
duty, which is typically based upon a standard of 
reasonable care, and the breach being a proximate cause 
and cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damages.  ‘In New 
                                                             
160 See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2006).  
 
161 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 229 (1996) (“Articles 17 and 
24(2) provide nothing more than a pass-through, authorizing us to apply the law that 
would govern in absence of the Warsaw Convention.”). 
 
162 See id. 
 
163 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (“In absence of an 
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law 
according to their own standards.”).  
 
164 Brooks v. Beech aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 56 (N.M. 1995). 
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Mexico, negligence encompasses the concepts of 
foreseeability of harm to the person injured and of a duty of 
care toward that person.’165 
 
[49] The court has held that while negligence is a question of fact for 
the jury, “a finding of negligence . . . is dependent upon the existence of a 
duty on the part of the defendant.”166  The existence of a duty is a question 
of law determined by the court.167  Since a plaintiff will likely have little 
problem showing damages in a matter concerning a spaceship accident, 
but will face difficulty proving a duty exists in the first place and the 
breach caused the injuries, this Article will focus solely on duty and 
breach under New Mexico law.  
 
A.  Duty 
 
[50] The question of duty in a negligent design of a defective product 
case is “a function of conscious choice, [because] design is conduct 
dependant.”168  As a result, a court’s determination on whether a duty 
exists to design and manufacture a non-defective spaceship will look to 
the designer’s actions and its knowledge at the time of design and 
production.  To determine whether a duty exists, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court analyzes both foreseeability and policy before deciding 
whether the plaintiff owed a duty to the defendant.169 
  
 
 
 
                                                             
165 Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 185-86 (N.M. 2003) (quoting Ramirez v. 
Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (N.M. 1983)). 
 
166 Id. at 186 (quoting Schear v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 687 P.2d 728, 729 (N.M. 1984)). 
 
167 E.g., id. (quoting Schear, 687 P.2d at 729). 
 
168 Beech, 902 P.2d at 59. 
 
169 See Herrera, 73 P.3d at 187 (quoting Madrid v. Lincoln Cnty. Med. Ctr., 909 P.2d 14, 
20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).  
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1.  Foreseeability 
 
[51] When evaluating foreseeability, New Mexico courts ask “whether 
the defendant's conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that 
poses a general threat of harm to others.”170  This analysis differs from the 
causation prong.  Foreseeability serves as a minimum threshold while the 
causation prong requires a much higher factual showing.171  A plaintiff 
involved in a tragic accident would not have a hard time proving the 
foreseeability prong of the duty analysis.  Thus, spaceship operators, like 
Virgin Galactic, and spaceship manufacturers, like The Spaceship 
Company,172 may, under this analysis, create a larger “zone of risk” posing 
a general threat of harm to others.  
 
[52] In response, a defendant could argue the danger was “open and 
obvious” thus limiting the “zone of risk.”173  The defendant could argue 
the plaintiff assumed an extremely broad “zone of risk” involved with 
climbing on-board experimental spaceships holding thousands of gallons 
of rocket-fuel.  As a result, the “zone of risk” associated with such 
operations could not expand based on the defendant’s conduct.   
 
                                                             
170 Herrera, 73 P.3d at 185-86 (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 953 So.2d 500, 502 
(Fla. 1992)); see also Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (N.M. 1990) (“[I]n 
determining duty, it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff 
– that he was within the zone of danger created by respondent's actions . . . .”). 
 
171 See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 
172 About, THE SPACESHIP COMPANY, available at http://www.thespaceshipcompany.com/ 
About.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (noting that “The Spaceship Company[] is a new 
aerospace production company, founded by Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin Group and 
Scaled Composites, which will be building the world’s first fleet of commercial 
spaceships . . . .[The Spaceschip Company] has contracted Scaled Composites to develop 
and build prototypes of [WhiteKnightTwo] and [SpaceShipTwo].”). 
 
173 Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 824 P.2d 293, 295-97 (N.M. 1992) (rejecting the “open 
and obvious” rule, which holds that there is no duty where the danger is reasonably 
known to others). 
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[53] While some jurisdictions recognize the “open and obvious” 
doctrine as a defense,174 the New Mexico Supreme Court firmly rejects 
it.175  In dealing with slip-and-fall cases, the court held “an owner or 
occupier of a premises cannot avoid liability for injuries that are obvious, 
abolishing the doctrine that landowners incur no liability for hazards that 
are open and obvious.”176  Without “open and obvious” as a defense, the 
obligation of operators and manufacturers like Virgin Galactic and The 
Spaceship Company to build and design spaceships without defects passes 
the foreseeability prong, making this obligation a duty.   
 
2.  Public Policy 
 
[54] When performing this analysis, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
first looks to whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a statutory duty.177  
As stated by the court, “‘[w]ith deference always to constitutional 
principles, it is the particular domain of the [L]egislature, as the voice of 
the people, to make public policy.’”178  For this reason, demonstrating a 
statutory duty may prove difficult for potential plaintiffs.  
 
[55] The New Mexico legislature introduced a bill in 2009 that would 
grant conditional liability immunity for commercial space travel providers 
against “the inherent risks of space flight activities.”179  Incidentally, New 
Mexico is not alone in this view.  In 2007, Virginia became the first state 
in the United States to enact legislation providing conditional immunity to 
                                                             
174 See, e.g., Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Theriot v. 
Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 1986); McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic 
Corp., No. 03:96-CV-538RP, 1997 WL 873829, at*10 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 1997). 
 
175 See Benavidez v. City of Gallup, 161 P.3d 853, 859 (N.M. 2007). 
 
176 Id. (citing Klopp, 824 P.2d at 297).  
 
177 See Herrera, 73 P.3d at 187.  
 
178 Id. (quoting Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (N.M. 1995)).  
 
179 S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009). 
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commercial space flight providers.180  Florida followed suit the next year, 
adopting the Spaceflight Informed Consent Act of 2008.181   
 
[56] The Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act bounced around from 
the Senate Committee on Public Affairs to the Senate Committee on 
Judiciary and back to the Senate Committee on Public Affairs before 
passing the committee with no recommendation.182  Still, the act sets forth 
the basic policies put before the Senate Floor of the New Mexico 
legislature.  These policies acknowledge:  
 
A. . . . New Mexico and its residents will gain significant 
economic and personal benefits from the development of a 
successful and robust commercial human space flight 
industry, while playing a significant role in its growth.  The 
development of the spaceport will create jobs and have a 
positive effect on the state’s tax base; [and] 
B. [C]ommercial human space flight activities involve 
inherent risks that cannot be eliminated or controlled 
through the exercise of reasonable care and that justify the 
exculpation of ordinary negligence, and that these inherent 
risks provide the challenge and excitement that entice space 
flight participants to participate in these activities . . . .183 
 
The Space Flight Liability and Immunity Act, then, would relieve the 
commercial space flight provider of liability, provided it acquires the 
passenger’s informed consent and does not commit “an act or omission 
                                                             
180 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8-.10 (2009); Mineiro, supra note 134, at 382 (citing 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8-.10 (2009)).  
 
181 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.401 (West 2009); Mineiro, supra note 134, at 382 (citing 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 331.401 (West 2009)).  
 
182 See Bill Tracking Report, S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009), available at 
http://www.westlaw.com/ (search “Find this document by citation” for “2009 NM S.B. 
37 (NS)”; then follow any of the hyperlinks returned). 
 
183 S.B. 37, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009).  
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that constitutes gross negligence evidencing willful or wanton disregard 
for the safety of a participant . . . or intentionally causes an injury.”184 
 
[57] While the act does not represent the law of New Mexico, it 
demonstrates the potential future state policy in light of the amount of 
economic incentives given to Spaceport America, which is located near 
the White Sands Missile Range in Southeast New Mexico.185  The 
Spaceport Authority expects to complete construction of hangars, a 
terminal, and a 10,000-foot runway in 2010.186  Because such projects are 
not cheap, in terms of money or state economic incentives, in 2006 the 
New Mexico legislature passed the Regional Spaceport District Act to 
provide economic incentives attracting Virgin Galactic and the developers 
of Spaceport America to the desert of Southern New Mexico.187   
 
[58] The mission will require $198 million from taxpayers, $56 million 
of which will come from gross receipts tax increases in two neighboring 
counties over the next ten years.188  To account for this the New Mexico 
Legislature placed three conditions upon the release of any state funding 
for the Spaceport America project.189  First, the entire cost of the project 
must remain below $225 million.190  Second, the Authority must secure an 
anchor tenant at Spaceport America.191  Third, the Authority must obtain a 
signed launch license from the FAA.192  The final pieces of the puzzle 
                                                             
184 Id.  
 
185 See Rene Romo, Spaceport Gets Its License to Launch: FAA Approval Clears Way for 
Construction to Begin, ALBUQUERQUE J., at C1.  
 
186 Id. 
 
187 See generally H.B. 473, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2006). 
 
188 Romo, supra note 185.  
 
189 Id. 
 
190 See id. 
 
191 See id. 
 
192 See id. 
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came together between late 2008 and early 2009 when Spaceport America 
obtained a license and Virgin Galactic signed a twenty-year lease with the 
state to use Spaceport America.193  The project broke ground in June of 
2009 and is now underway.194  
 
[59] The policy behind all of this is clear.  In much the same way that 
the dual mandate of the FAA and AST appear to conflict with safety, it 
seems apparent that New Mexico’s investment into Spaceport America 
could conflict with Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company’s duty to 
manufacture a safe product, especially with the amount of deference given 
to the legislature as  policy setters.  While this issue could go either way, it 
exposes the tenuous position facing plaintiffs when bringing negligence 
claims.  These problems only intensify when considering the burden the 
plaintiff must meet to satisfy the causation element.  
 
B.  Proximate Cause 
 
[60] The New Mexico Supreme Court defines proximate cause as “that 
which in a natural and continuous sequence [unbroken by an independent 
intervening cause] produces the injury, and without which the injury 
would not have occurred.”195  A plaintiff’s case moves forward if a 
rational jury concludes that a breach of the duty established under the 
above analysis caused the plaintiff’s injuries.196  The main difficulty for a 
plaintiff’s case, in the context of commercial space travel, surrounds the 
investigation of accidents involving spacecrafts.  Typically, little, if 
anything, will remain after these accidents due to explosions or 
disintegrations upon re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, as witnessed in 
the Challenger explosion in 1986 and Columbia’s disintegration during re-
                                                             
 
193 See Diana M. Alba, Spaceport To Break Ground, ALAMOGORDO DAILY NEWS (New 
Mexico), June 19, 2009, at NEWS.  
 
194 See id. 
 
195 Herrera, 73 P.3d at 195 (citing Uniform Jury Instructions, 13-305 NMRA 2003). 
 
196 See id. 
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entry in 2003.197  While NASA possesses the resources to look into these 
issues, a typical plaintiff likely does not possess the financial means or 
scientific expertise to develop the evidence for the causation element.  
 
[61] But all is not lost for the plaintiff.  New Mexico law allows the 
plaintiff, in the absence of proof of specific negligent acts, to make a 
prima facie case of negligence based on a res ipsa loquitor theory.198  To 
prove negligence through res ipsa loquitor, a plaintiff generally must 
show:  “(1) that the accident be of the kind which ordinarily does not 
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; [and] (2) that it must be 
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control and 
management of defendant.”199  With respect to claims stemming from 
commercial space travel, assuming a plaintiff would experience little 
difficulty showing accidents such as explosions or disintegrations would 
not have occurred absent manufacturer negligence, he may find it difficult 
to prove the defendant’s exclusive control and management of the 
spacecraft.  For example, a plaintiff would have a hard time showing The 
Spaceship Company has exclusive control of the spaceships because 
Virgin Galactic operates the crafts.200  Conversely, it would be quite 
difficult to prove Virgin Galactic maintained exclusive control and 
management of spaceship operations because The Spaceship Company 
manufactures the vessels.  As such, plaintiffs suing commercial space 
travel providers under a negligence theory in New Mexico state court must 
not only overcome the burden of proving a statutory duty, but the burden 
of proving the control and management element of res ipsa loquitor.   
                                                             
197 See John Noble Wilford, With Fear and Wonder in Its Wake, Sputnik Lifted Us Into 
the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at F2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/09/25/science/space/25sput.html; see also infra Part IV.C (discussing the efforts 
that went into finding the cause of the Columbia disaster). 
 
198 See Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 278 P.2d 575, 577 (N.M. 1955).  
 
199 Renfro v. J.D. Coggins Co., 378 P.2d 130, 134 (N.M. 1963) (citing Tafoya, 278 P.2d 
at 577).  
 
200 See Eric Gershon, Pratt to Power Civilian Spaceship Jet Engine Picked for Launch 
Aircraft, Hartford Courant, July 12, 2007, at E1 (“Virgin Galactic will own and operate 
the aircraft.”). 
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V.  THE DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING STRICT LIABILITY 
 
[62] Unfortunately, application of a strict liability theory does not make 
the road to recovery any easier.  The New Mexico Supreme Court 
distinguishes strict liability and negligence as such: “Negligence focuses 
on conduct.  Strict liability focuses on the product.”201  As a result, New 
Mexico courts distinguish between claims based on a product and claims 
based on a service,202 and have held that “negligent services may trigger 
ordinary negligence, malpractice or breach of contract actions, but [they 
do] not form the basis for actions in strict liability.”203  This holding 
follows the majority rule for applying strict liability as recognized in other 
jurisdictions.204  Analogizing the initial commercial space travel flights to 
amusement park rides demonstrates the difficulties associated with 
bringing a products liability claim.   
 
[63] Applying this analogy, New Mexico would likely follow the 
majority of jurisdictions, holding commercial space travel “providers” as 
merely “provid[ing] persons with a service; namely a ride on a 
machine.”205  As a result, companies like Virgin Galactic and other 
providers of space “rides” would not face strict liability for a defective 
product. 
 
                                                             
201 Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 60 (N.M. 1995) (emphasis in original).  
 
202 See, e.g., Trujillo v. Berry, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).  
 
203 Id. 
 
204 See, e.g., Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 25 (N.H. 1984).  
 
205 See id.; see also Fellner v. Phila. Togboggan Coasters, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-218-SEB-
WGH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53652, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2006) (citing Marsh v. 
Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)); Sells v. Six Flags Over Tex., Inc., 
No. 3:96-CV-1574-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23747, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1997); 
Marsh, 707 N.E.2d at 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
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[64] Under this legal framework the plaintiff could sue the 
manufacturer of the defective product, but not the provider of a service 
using the defective product.206  The New Mexico Supreme Court explains: 
 
The policy underpinnings supporting imposition of strict 
liability on product manufacturers and suppliers include (1) 
ensuring that the risk of loss for injury resulting from 
defective products is borne by the suppliers, principally 
because they are in a position to absorb the loss by 
distributing it as a cost of doing business; (2) encouraging 
suppliers to select reputable and responsible manufacturers 
who generally design and construct safe products and who 
generally accept financial responsibility for injuries caused 
by their defective products ; and (3) promoting fairness by 
ensuring that plaintiffs injured by an unreasonably 
dangerous product are compensated for their injuries.207  
  
This leaves plaintiffs with the daunting task of proving the spaceship’s 
faulty design to maintain an action against the manufacturer for strict 
products liability.   
 
[65] Proper distribution of the costs of operating business is a driving 
force behind the rule of products liability.208  In essence, products liability 
acts as a form of insurance.209  Manufacturers make their products 
understanding the possibility of defects and that no product is perfect.210  
As a result, the manufacturer increases the price of the product to pay for 
the product liability costs of inevitable accidents.211  The New Mexico 
                                                             
206 See Trujillo, 738 P.2d at 1334.  
 
207 Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
Brooks, 902 P.2d at 57-58).  
 
208 Brooks, 902 P.2d at 60.  
 
209 See id. 
 
210 See id. 
 
211 See id. 
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Supreme Court recognized this cost-spreading rationale as a basis for 
adopting strict product liability for defective design, holding that “[a]s 
long as the price of a defective product line or successive product lines 
reflect some element of injury costs, the policy goal of cost distribution 
has been served.”212  While the New Mexico courts have yet to finely 
articulate the elements of a defective design claim, other states have 
defined the elements.213  
 
[66] The Florida Supreme Court has held that: 
 
In order to hold a manufacturer liable on the theory of strict 
liability in tort, the user must establish [1] the 
manufacturer’s relationship to the product in question, [2] 
the defect and unreasonably dangerous condition of the 
product, and [3] the existence of the proximate causal 
connection between such condition and the user’s injuries 
or damages.214 
 
These elements appear in line with the strict liability policies embraced by 
the New Mexico Supreme Court, and are therefore applied for the 
purposes of this Article’s strict liability analysis, which uses the 
relationship between Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company as an 
example. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
212 Id. 
 
213 See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 
214 West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976); see also Smith v. 
Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Mass. 1978) (listing the elements necessary under 
Massachusetts law for showing a design defect); Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 
P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993) (listing the elements necessary under Utah law for applying 
strict product liability to a defective product).  
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A.  The Manufacturer’s Relationship to the Product in Question 
 
[67] A plaintiff’s biggest problem in a potential suit against Virgin 
Galactic and The Spaceship Company lies in demonstrating individual 
manufacturer liability.  The company closest to becoming the first to 
provide spaceflight service, in this case Virgin Galactic, operates more or 
less as both service provider and manufacturer of spaceships putting 
tourists in orbit, because the majority owner of Virgin Galactic holds a 
majority share in The Spaceship Company, which currently makes 
SpaceShipTwo and WhiteKnightTwo exclusively for Virgin Galactic.215  
 
[68] In Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, Inc., the Fifth Circuit addressed the 
difficulty of holding a product’s manufacturer liable when its parent 
company provides a service related to the product at issue.216  In 
Rodriguez, the manufacturer of a football helmet did not include a new, 
safer type of foam inside the helmet.217  The company responsible for 
reconditioning the helmet, which was part of the same parent company as 
the manufacturer, also did not include the new foam.218  The plaintiff wore 
one of these helmets during a football game, and upon making his last 
tackle, he suffered an irreparable brain injury leaving him in a vegetative 
state.219  The injured wearer and his mother subsequently sued the helmet 
manufacturer and its related companies.220 
 
[69] The Fifth Circuit held that the company reconditioning the helmet 
provided a service and could not face strict liability unless it maintained 
control equating to the role of manufacturer.221  The court also noted that 
                                                             
215 See id.  
 
216 See Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, Inc., 242 F.3d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 
217 See id.  
 
218 See id. 
 
219 Id.  
 
220 See id.  
 
221 See Rodriguez, 242 F.3d at 576. 
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the safer alternative, in this case the new foam, did not exist until well 
after the manufacturer made the helmet.222  Furthermore, it stated, “if 
combining two corporations into one is necessary to apply a strict liability 
standard, then plaintiffs must prove that the corporations should be 
combined . . . .”223  Thus, the plaintiff would have to pierce the corporate 
veil, an extremely unlikely proposition, before combining the defendants 
for purposes of applying strict liability to both the manufacturer and the 
provider.224  The Fifth Circuit found that the lower court could not 
combine the defendants for purposes of litigation.225 
 
[70] The plaintiff in any accident involving a trip aboard Virgin 
Galactic will face similar problems to those faced by the plaintiff in 
Rodriguez.  The Spaceship Company manufactures the spaceship serviced 
and operated by Virgin Galactic.  If new safety technology is developed 
after The Spaceship Company delivers the spaceships to Virgin Galactic 
and the spaceships are not upgraded, the plaintiff likely cannot combine 
the two obviously related companies in a lawsuit unless it can convince 
the court to pierce the corporate veil.  Rodriguez exemplifies the difficulty 
of such a task.  Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot allege strict liability 
against Virgin Galactic for the product defect since it was not the 
manufacturer and it did not sell the product specifically to the plaintiff.226 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
222 Id. at 574-75.  
 
223 Id. at 573. 
 
224 See id.  Courts apply corporate veil doctrine less than half the time.  See Robert B. 
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1048 (1991) (“Courts pierced the veil in about 40% of reported cases.”). 
 
225 See Rodriguez, 242 F.3d. at 573, 577. 
 
226 See supra IV.B (discussing proximate cause). 
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B.  The Defect and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of the Product 
 
[71] New Mexico law also requires a determination of whether a 
product is unreasonably dangerous.227  Courts use an “unreasonable risk of 
injury test” to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.228  
“An unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably prudent 
person having full knowledge of the risk would find unacceptable.”229  But 
presence of high risk is not dispositive of liability, as the jury must also 
calculate “whether the risk can be eliminated without seriously impairing 
the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.”230  Jury 
instructions further emphasize this point because they “encourage a risk-
benefit calculation by defining ‘unreasonable risk of injury’ in a way 
which requires the jury to balance meritorious choices for safety made by 
the manufacturer while minimizing the risk that the public will be 
deprived needlessly of beneficial products.”231  
 
[72] The spaceships made by The Spaceship Company present unique 
difficulties in applying the risk-benefit calculation.232  Costs of 
manufacturing and maintaining the spaceships could easily skyrocket, 
driving down the risk-benefit calculation, and weakening the case that the 
product was unreasonably dangerous.  Furthermore, additional costs 
associated with part repair or redesign could price the ships out of the 
market, especially considering each voyage already costs around 
$200,000.233  While Virgin Galactic plans to bring launch frequencies up 
                                                             
227 Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
 
228 Id. (citing Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61 (N.M. 1995). 
 
229 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
230 See id. (citing Brooks, 902 P.2d at 61-63).  
 
231 Id. (citations omitted).  
 
232 See generally Smith, 33 P.3d 638. 
 
233 See generally Norris, supra note 3 (discussing the high cost of flights of Virgin 
Galactic’s spaceships). 
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and costs down,234 these changes will depend upon how soon voyages 
begin running.  
 
[73] Personal interests of New Mexico residents in the spaceship launch 
may also influence juror risk-benefit analysis.  As previously stated, at 
least 350 people have already invested nearly $40 million in deposits.235  
Virgin Galactic has also promised a free voyage annually (a $200,000 
value) for one local resident from each county that approved taxes for the 
construction of Spaceport America.236  Additionally, a New Mexico State 
University Report conservatively estimates the economic impact of these 
commercial space travel activities will be “$991.45 million, generating 
$296.62 million in earnings, and sustaining 2,284 jobs per year by the fifth 
year [of operation],” indicating meaningful economic revitalization for the 
state.237  This money becomes even more important in a “state [facing a 
budget] shortfall of up to $500 million due to declining oil and natural gas 
tax revenue and a slowdown in consumer spending.”238  While these 
figures do not deal directly with the cost of designing a product not 
unreasonably dangerous, the numbers show that a significant amount of 
money is tied to the successful launch and longevity of the program.  
Needless to say, New Mexico has a stake in ensuring the program is a 
success.  As such, New Mexico jurors utilizing this risk-benefit balancing 
test could find it very difficult to overlook its overall benefit to the 
community.239  
                                                             
234 See id. 
 
235  See Park Avenue Travel, supra note 19. 
 
236 See Diana M. Alba, Virgin Galactic Sweetens Spaceport Deal Ahead of Tax Vote, LAS 
CRUCES SUN-NEWS (New Mexico), Apr. 17, 2008, at NEWS. 
 
237 See ARROWHEAD CTR., N.M. STATE UNIV., BUSINESS PLAN FOR THE SOUTHWEST 
REGIONAL SPACEPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.spaceportamerica.com/ 
images/pdf/NMSU_Report.pdf. 
 
238 See Quigley Winthrop, PRIVATE SECTOR’S NEW CHAMPION; Governor Takes 
Businessfriendly Record to Bigger Stage, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 7, 2008, at A1.  
 
239 See Smith, 33 P.3d at 644 (explaining how jurors balance the public’s choices for 
safety while minimizing the risk of depriving individuals from beneficial products). 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology                   Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
  45 
[74] Courts in other jurisdictions will allow the trier of fact to consider 
compliance with regulation standards in products liability cases, including 
those involving an airplane’s compliance with FAA standards.240  While 
FAA compliance does not provide a complete defense, “in a field as 
closely regulated as aircraft design and manufacture, it is proper to take 
into consideration . . . the fact that the regulatory agency has approved the 
very design of which they complain after considering the dangers 
involved.”241    
 
[75] The problem arises because the FAA has yet to determine precisely 
what type of safety restrictions apply to this new type of vehicle.242  
Creating further confusion is the fact that regulations specifically allow the 
FAA to consider suggestions from the manufacturer of the vehicle on 
allowable parameters for performance and safety.243  In essence, the 
company developing the spaceship itself can define what classifies as a 
“defect.”244 
 
[76] As a result, the plaintiff will face extreme difficulties 
demonstrating the product as unreasonably dangerous under either theory.  
The cost of making the perfect spaceship at this late stage and the fact that 
the first trip into orbit only years away will prove too high for a jury 
required to balance economics and safety.  Moreover, the industry’s ability 
to set its own standards under FAA regulation will only further weaken 
potential product liability claims raised against The Spaceship 
Company.245 
                                                             
 
240 See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Or. 1978).  
 
241 See id.  
 
242 See supra Parts II.A-B. 
 
243 See 14 C.F.R. § 414.19(a)(4) (2006) (identifying applicant-developed criteria as a 
factor the FAA may assess to determine whether to approve a safety feature). 
 
244 See id. § 414.19(a)(4). 
 
245 See id. 
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C.  The Proximate Causal Connection 
 
[77] The burden to demonstrate a defective product caused the injury is 
another challenge plaintiffs face in products liability suits.  The magnitude 
of this difficulty becomes clear in light of the seven-month long 
investigation that followed the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster.246  
Over the course of this investigation more than 120 staff members and 400 
NASA engineers deposed countless experts and reviewed more than 
30,000 documents, and more than 25,000 searchers collected spacecraft 
debris from across the Western United States.247  According to the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (“Board”), “[b]ecause the events 
that initiated the accident were not apparent for some time, the 
investigation’s depth and breadth were unprecedented in NASA 
history.”248 
 
[78] The Board characterized the process to determine the “chain of 
circumstances” that caused the Columbia accident “particularly 
challenging.”249  It noted the importance of “[e]vidence . . . derived from 
film and video [images] of the launch, radar images of Columbia on orbit, 
and amateur video of debris shedding during the in-flight breakup . . . [as 
well as] sensors onboard the orbiter . . . [and] [a]nalysis of the debris.”250  
In the end, the Board determined a piece of foam with the volume of 1200 
cubic inches,251 about the size of a large bag of hamster bedding,252 hit 
                                                             
246 See Mark Carreau, Columbia Probe Continues for Some; Gehman, Handful of Others 
To Work on Appendices to Disaster Report, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2003, at A17. 
 
247 1 COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
BOARD REPORT 9 (2003), available at http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/ 
vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf.  
 
248 Id. at 11.  
 
249 Id. 
 
250 Id. at 49.  
 
251 See id. at 61.  
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Columbia less than a minute-and-a-half after launch, which breached the 
Thermal Protection System on the left wing and eventually caused the 
wing to fall apart during re-entry.253  
 
[79] It is unlikely that a plaintiff who files suit against a space travel 
provider will have the necessary resources to determine whether a defect 
caused an accident.  As indicated by the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board Report, even a defect as small and insignificant as 1200 cubic 
inches material detaching from WhiteKnightTwo and hitting 
SpaceShipTwo, is enough to cause a devastating accident.254  Furthermore, 
even if a plaintiff had the resources to utilize the expertise necessary to 
uncover the cause of space travel accidents, the passenger’s, or the 
passenger’s family’s, ability to obtain data related to the cause of an 
accident during discovery would hinge on the record keeping practices of 
carriers like Virgin Galactic 
 
VI.  THE “AMUSEMENT PARK” APPROACH TO STRICT LIABILITY – THE 
FRANCIONI MODEL 
 
[80] Neither the FAA/AST nor the courts applying negligence and 
product liability theories can ensure commercial space travel carriers and 
manufacturers of the spaceships will provide safe vehicles for passengers 
to lift-off into space.  Thus, Congress must take action to establish a 
scheme to protect the public at-large.   
 
[81] The enactment of strict liability schemes applicable to products or 
services not previously covered under the traditional approach is not a 
novel concept.255  The Ohio legislature, for example, passed a statute 
                                                             
252 See Kaytee Aspen Bedding 1,200 Cubic Inches, ALL FERRET (Aug. 4, 2008), 
http://www.allferret.com/406/ kaytee-aspen-bedding-1200-cubic-inches/.  
 
253 See COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 247, at 49. 
 
254 See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.  
 
255 See, e.g., State v. Buehler Food Mkts., Inc., 552 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) 
(citing State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 200 N.E.2d 590,592 (Ohio 1964)). 
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requiring that food intended for sale be packaged according to appropriate 
weights and measures.256  The Ohio Court of Appeals, which considered 
whether the legislature intended to impose strict liability despite the 
statute’s silence on the matter, reasoned that “[t]he more serious the 
consequences are to the public, the more likely the legislature meant to 
impose liability without fault.”257  
 
[82] In the case of commercial space travel, the safety of the passenger 
and the costs of ensuring that safety, necessitate a statute imposing 
liability without fault.  Still, as previously discussed, the legislature must 
refrain from overregulation to ensure the development of commercial 
space travel.258  The approach Pennsylvania courts adopt when imposing 
strict liability on operators of amusement parks provides that solution.259  
This approach uses the following four-factor test:  
 
(1) whether the defendant is the only member of the 
marketing chain available to the injured plaintiff for 
redress; 
(2) whether the imposition of strict liability would serve as 
an incentive to safety;  
(3) whether the defendant is in a better position than the 
consumer to prevent circulation of defective products; and 
(4) whether the defendant can distribute the cost of 
compensating for injuries resulting from defects by 
charging for it in the business.260 
 
                                                             
256 See id. at  681 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1327.61(B) (LexisNexis 2006)).  
 
257 Id. at 682.  
 
258 See supra Part II. 
 
259 See, e.g., Rossetti v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 
260 Id. at 419 (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989) 
(citing Francioni, 372 A.2d 736)).  
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[83] The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the four factors.261  
Congress or the FAA/AST should adopt this standard and explicitly state 
that it applies not only to sellers of spaceships, but also to buyers that 
maintain and operate spaceships.262  Adopting this standard will protect 
future space tourists and ensure the development of commercial space 
travel.  
 
A. Whether the Defendant Is the Only Member of the Marketing 
Chain Available to the Injured Plaintiff for Redress 
 
[84] The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has interpreted the first 
element to require that the plaintiff show he would likely not recover from 
the defendant manufacturer before he attempts to recover from another 
member of the marketing chain.263  Consequently, the plaintiff must 
present “any information regarding the identity of parties other than the 
defendant who might have been involved in the marketing chain.”264  
Using Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company as an example, a 
plaintiff will have a difficult time recovering from the companies due to 
the nature of their corporate relationship.265  Importantly, this standard will 
prevent a plaintiff from suing Virgin Galactic and other travel providers as 
other manufacturers supply them with new spaceships.  As a result, the 
standard keeps regulation during the development of the commercial space 
                                                             
261 See id. at 420 n.3.  
 
262 Even in this setting, where Pennsylvania common law authorizes the filing of a 
products liability suit against an amusement park operator, courts remain reluctant to 
apply the products liability scheme.  Compare Coppersmith v. Herco Inc., 29 Pa. D. & 
C.4th 73, 77 (Pa. C.P. 1996) (holding that a broadened meaning of “seller” effectuates the 
policy behind strict liability), with Rossetti, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 419 (quoting Musser v. 
Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 281 (Pa. 1989)) (declaring limits to strict liability 
when “the purposes of the policy ‘will not be served’”). 
 
263 See Rossetti, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 420.  
 
264 Coppersmith, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th at 78.  
 
265 See supra Part V.A (explaining that a plaintiff must pierce the corporate veil in order 
to combine companies situated similarly to Virgin Galactic and The Spaceship Company 
to apply a strict liability scheme). 
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travel business to a minimum, and provides plaintiffs with the opportunity 
to recover from those responsible for the manufacture of the spaceship.  
 
B.  Whether the Imposition of Strict Liability Would 
Serve as an Incentive to Safety 
 
[85] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized this standard 
would be little more than “a futile gesture in promoting the manufacture 
and distribution of safer products” if the defendant were not “in the 
business of designing and/or manufacturing any particular product or 
products.”266  But this flexible standard disappears when unrelated 
manufacturers begin to make the spaceships used by operators like Virgin 
Galactic,267 forcing operators to think twice before pushing a sister 
company to place an unsafe product on the market solely for the purpose 
of business development.  The standard also incentivizes operators to 
encourage the private market to manufacture safe spaceships, which will 
help eliminate strict liability and negligence claims.   
 
C.  Whether the Defendant Is in a Better Position than the Consumer 
to Prevent Circulation of Defective Products 
 
[86] According to Pennsylvania courts, the question of whether the 
defendant more effectively prevents circulation of defective products 
“turns on the existence of an ongoing relationship between the defendant 
and the manufacturer ‘from which some financial advantage inures to the 
benefit of the [manufacturer] and which confers some degree of influence 
on the [defendant]’ in the manufacturing process.”268  Using Virgin 
Galactic and The Spaceship Company as an example, the relationship 
                                                             
266 Musser, 562 A.2d at 282. 
 
267 See Norris, supra note 3 (stating that presently Virgin Galactic receives spaceships 
exclusively from The Spaceship Company). 
 
268 Coppersmith, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th at 79 (quoting Musser, 262 A.2d at 282).  
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clearly shows The Spaceship Company benefits from Virgin Galactic’s 
success as a space tourism provider.269  
 
[87] The second part of this test strengthens the argument that the 
operator is in a position to prevent circulation of a defective product.  
Virgin Galactic, by reason of its close connection with The Spaceship 
Company,270 has significant influence over The Spaceship Company’s 
manufacturing process.  First and foremost, The Spaceship Company has 
only one client, Virgin Galactic, to which it exclusively provides a 
product.271  Secondly, with such a limited number of potential space 
tourism companies capable of conducting launches in the near future, The 
Spaceship Company would have difficulty finding another customer.272  
Lastly, the ownership groups of both companies containing at least one 
mutual member shows the degree of influence Virgin Galactic maintains 
over the manufacturer of its spaceships.273   
 
[88] Importantly, this factor becomes harder for a plaintiff to prove the 
more advanced and competitive the commercial space market becomes.  
Thus, as more spaceship providers come onto the scene, the easier it 
becomes for a plaintiff to bring a claim under traditional strict liability and 
negligence, and the Francioni liability scheme will slowly disappear in 
favor of more traditional theories of negligence and products liability. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
269 See Norris, supra note 3 (describing the exclusive relationship between manufacturer 
and provider). 
 
270 See id. 
 
271 See id. 
 
272 See supra note 2 (explaining that other business entities are only in the development 
stages of creating commercial space travel technologies). 
 
273 See Norris, supra note 3.  Importantly, this factor likely becomes harder for a plaintiff 
to prove the more advanced and competitive the commercial space market becomes. 
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D. Whether the Defendant Can Distribute the Cost of Compensating for 
Injuries Resulting from Defects by Charging for It in the Business 
 
[89] Of the four factors, the defendant’s distribution of costs is the 
easiest for the plaintiff to show.  In the same way the Court of Common 
Pleas found it “reasonable to conclude that the defendant can distribute the 
cost of compensating for injuries resulting from defective products by 
charging for it in the price of admission to [an amusement park],”274 it also 
seems reasonable to conclude an operator like Virgin Galactic could 
distribute costs through ticket sales to eager space tourists.  Considering 
passengers will already pay $200,000 to ride in space,275 an extra few 
thousand dollars for insurance against a strict liability claim will likely not 
deter ticket sales, which takes into consideration one of the primary goals 
seen in modern courts’ application of products liability as a cost-shifting 
platform.276 
 
VI. CONCLUSION – FRANCIONI MODEL ESSENTIAL TO BLAST-OFF! 
 
[90] The liability scheme derived from Francioni provides the 
FAA/AST answers to questions concerning liability and RLVs while 
protecting the agency from the dangers of agency capture.277  The 
FAA/AST should limit regulation regardless of the addition of humans to 
RLVs, fostering the long-term innovative development of technologies 
that make commercial space travel safer.  Limits on regulation remain 
especially important considering the FAA/AST does not yet have a 
scheme in place to provide this service.278  
 
                                                             
274 Coppersmith, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th at 79. 
 
275 See Booking, supra note 16.  
 
276 Brooks, 902 P.2d at 60. 
 
277 See supra note 35, for the questions posed by the AST regarding human space flight. 
 
278 See Ryabinkin, supra note 38 (explaining that the agency is “developing vehicle and 
human safety-related guidelines for commercial RLVs.”). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology                   Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
  53 
[91] But this is not to say that the FAA/AST should disregard the safety 
of RLV’s and their passengers.  Congress or the FAA/AST should set a 
limit on acceptable risk by using the products liability scheme initially 
used for assessing amusement park liability.279  Strict liability on operators 
like Virgin Galactic, provides passengers a cause of action in difficult 
evidentiary cases, while simultaneously allowing the commercial space 
travel industry to develop.  More importantly, strict liability gives 
operators and manufacturers, who both likely have a vested interest in the 
operation taking off, a moment of pause to consider the safety of the lives 
they carry aboard their newly developed spaceships.  Strict liability also 
prevents the government from placing obstacles like insurance policy 
requirements and other regulatory impediments on the developing 
businesses, while at the same time protecting passengers.  Just as 
important, this strict liability scheme will disappear as soon as the need for 
tighter standards for “sister corporations,” protecting operators from 
liability, fades with more competition.  In turn, the competition will lead 
to innovative developments in the commercial space industry.  
 
[92]  A strict liability scheme will ensure the safety of passengers on 
board commercial space flights.  It will also enact a risk-sharing regime 
not necessarily available through regulations targeting a technology still in 
development.  Thus, to protect passengers, while limiting regulation to 
encourage the development of the space tourism business, the 
Pennsylvania model of strict liability should serve as the launching pad for 
safe commercial space travel to blast off. 
 
                                                             
279 See Rossetti, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
